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INTRODUCTION
One of the distinctive features of the Silicon Flatirons Conference,
both this yeari and last,2 is that it rightly focuses on how legal rules of
property should be adapted to deal with different forms of resources,
which have in common some, but not all attributes. With Silicon
Flatirons, the discussion often turns to water, minerals, and intellectual
* The Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School of Law;
the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and the James Parker
Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Senior Lecturer, The University of Chicago.
This article is a much revised and expanded version of the remarks that I gave on March 12,
2015 at the Silicon Flatirons Conference at the University of Colorado Law School: Exploring
Governance Strategies for the Public Domain/Commons in Intellectual Property Wireless
Spectrum, and Water Rights. My thanks to Rachel E. Cohn, Krista Perry, The University of
Chicago Law School Class of 2016, and Julia Haines, The University of Chicago Law School
Class of 2017, for their usual excellent research assistance.
1. Exploring Governance Strategies for the Public Domain/Commons in Intellectual
Property, Wireless Spectrum, and Water Rights, SILICON FLATIRONS CTR. (Mar. 12, 2015),
http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/events.php?id=1496.
2. Property Rights in Spectrum, Water, and Minerals, SILICON FLATIRONS CTR. (Apr. 3,
2014), http://www.silicon-flatirons.org/cvents.php?id=1429. For the article based on the
remarks I gave at the 2014 conference, which is in a sense a companion to this essay, see




property. Yet ironically, property rights in land-perhaps the oldest area
of property rights-frequently are not at the center of this discussion,
even though everyone knows that the land paradigm is typically the
reference point from which comparisons to other forms of property are
made. So to start this essay, I will bring land back into the picture
because it allows a clearer examination of one central challenge to all
property systems: how we think about the distribution between private
and common rights with respect to various forms of property. Some
people will say this is a very modem question, but of course, it is not. If
you go back and you read Justinian, it begins the discussion of property
with the discussion of res communis, which is property that is open to all
in the state of nature, and the res nullius, which is property that is owned
by no one, but that can be acquired by a single individual through
occupation or possession of some sort.3 Justinian offers the water, the
beach, and the air as illustrations of res communis, just as he gives land,
chattels, and animals as instances of a res nullius.4
There is a lesson here. The two terms, res communis and res nullius,
should never be conflated. A res communis refers to a communal
resource, or more precisely, a resource open to all persons in the state of
nature, where no person is entitled unilaterally to reduce it to private
ownership by individual occupation. A res nullius refers to a thing
owned by no one, which is, however, in fact capable of being reduced to
private ownership through occupation of land, seizure of chattels, or
capturing animals.
The real challenge is to decide which assets have been and should
be placed into one box instead of the other and to develop an explanation
as to why. In the typical ancient legal systems, the lack of a precise
answer led jurists to say that their conclusions were a function of at least
two things. One of these is natural reason, by which they meant the
powers of deduction. The other turns out to be custom-or the
accumulated practices over time-either within or across communities,
reflected in learned treatises and applied in individual cases. On this
view, one must first ask what system of property has been ingrained in
law and practice from the beginning of time. Thereafter, one must ask
this very difficult question: What tradeoffs lead to putting resources on
either side of the private/commons line? The problem is still more
complicated because in some instances, most notably involving water
and some forms of intellectual property, the proper integration of both
private and common rights is part of any stable property rights solution.
3. See JUSTINIAN I, JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 55 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans.,
1987) (533) (discussing the classification of things).
4. See id.
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It turns out there is a fairly interesting way to describe the problem,
one that essentially retraces the eternal battle between the externality
problem on the one side and the holdout problem on the other. Whenever
anyone either creates or finds something, his actions necessarily have
spillover effects on the activities, both individual and collective, of other
individuals. Sometimes these externalities are positive, at which point
there is little concern with rectification. But often in a world of scarcity,
these externalities are negative, so the question arises whether the losses
of that outsider from exclusion should be regarded as "actionable" or
"cognizable" externalities. Those odd terms are an essential part of the
legal and social mix, and it would be clearly an impossible universe if
anyone could sue anyone else for actions that leave him worse off in
economic terms. Indeed, one of the great advantages of private property
is that it gives its owner the incentives to preserve and develop that
property, a benefit that would be clearly lost if others could harvest
where he has sown. There is a need to preserve these productive
activities, so the trick, therefore, is to narrow down the definition of
externality for legal purposes so that it covers only a smallish subset of
the full range of harmful human behaviors. This exercise requires serious
limitations be imposed on John Stuart Mill's harm principle, "the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."s
In general, the correct way to narrow the harm principle is to
concentrate not on harm generally, but first on force and fraud, so as to
exclude from the legal catalog of actions any that purport to supply
redress to competitive losses in a market economy. The explanation is
that any private dispute between two parties should be resolved in ways
that reflect the gains to overall social welfare. Force and fraud correlate
well with social losses. In contrast, competitive losses are usually
inversely related to social welfare, given the general efficiency gains
from the operation of competitive markets.
The situation is somewhat different with respect to the commons
because, in the simplest open-access regimes referred to by Justinian, all
may enter but none may exclude others. At this point, the harm comes
not from being excluded but from the risk of overuse and congestion
when there is no way to keep individuals out-the very problem that
systems of private property tend to avoid. Whenever the intensity of use
is low, normally there is little reason to develop institutions and practices
that attend to these problems. But as the intensity of use becomes larger,
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (London, John W. Parker & Son, West Strand
1859). For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle-And How it Grew, 45 U.
TORONTO L.J. 369 (1995).
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some other solution is often needed. In some cases, the use of commons
is limited to the designated individuals who can enter it, and they in turn
can, by agreement or custom, devise some practices to deal with
congestion and overuse. In some cases, privatization may supply an
answer, but in other situations where transportation or communications
are essential, the appropriate solution may involve some regulation of the
commons that continues to allow access while denying unlimited use. To
put it another way, the simple Roman definition of the res communis
takes place in an institutional void, which sooner or later has to be filled
by some public governance structure.
Why? Because using public governance becomes the lesser of two
evils. Allowing privatization in the domains of communication and
transportation may create an alternative difficulty-namely the blockade
problem. If we want to configure a river so that it is owned privately by a
group of individuals, the value of the river as a means for transportation
from top to bottom plummets. If one person can block it here, another
can block it there, and a third can block it somewhere else, it is virtually
impossible to organize a set of bargains that will restore open access over
the length of the river. What is needed, therefore, is a mixed regime that
provides both open access on the one hand, and public management on
the other. That can only happen if we deviate from the original res
communis, which guaranteed open access but nothing more. At this point
the question is how to best deviate from the polar case-like the good
tailor who has a tuck here and a hem there-to move from the natural
law to some more complex hybrid system. If so, we have to talk about
something that nobody seems to want to talk about today: whether
payment of just compensation is a sensible mechanism when there is a
social need to redefine rights when, as with travel by water, and later by
air, earlier legal regimes become obsolescent or inefficient.
If you want to understand the interdependence of the distribution
between the commons and private spaces, it is often helpful to think
about how the human body (indeed those of all advanced animals) serves
as a template for larger social structures. We basically have two kinds of
systems in our bodies: the long and skinny, and the short and squat. The
long and skinny are the neural systems and the blood systems:
information and nutrition, as it were. The short and squat are the organs
that have various kinds of specialization: bodily factories like livers,
hearts and lungs. If you do not have the long and skinny, there is no way
in which you can coordinate activities between solid organs; there is also
no way in which you can keep supplying them with the fuel that they
need to run. But if you only have a bunch of roadways going back and
forth, there will be no productive sites that will allow for digestion,
mentation, and all vital bodily functions. So the body basically organizes
184 [Vol. 14.2
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itself by evolutionary forces into a commons, which is designed to deal
with the communications and transportation, and the solid organs, which
essentially allow for specialized development of the activities for
survival.
With these preliminaries in place, I am going to take the three topics
we discussed and treat them in order of their historical evolution, with
the greatest emphasis upon the emergence of governance systems for
water through the public trust doctrine. There was no Roman law of
patents and copyrights; one paid people to copy things, and invention
was not an organized science. So those are historically not the first fields
to address. That first field is water law, in which there is a very strong
ancient body of rules. Patents and other forms of intellectual property
come next, and spectrum comes third, each with its distinctive problems.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF WATER LAW
A. The Rise of The Public Trust
The discussion of the distribution of functions in the body helps
organize the discussion of the role of public and private property. Thus,
when you start looking at a society under ius naturale-that is, the law
and practices before sovereign power is established-that basic pattern
still holds. It turns out that rivers and beaches and trails are long and
skinny-these are the ways in which societies connect different
individuals. If you allow for their privatization, there is very little that
can be done to secure trade between individuals, each pinned to their
own little island. Getting gains from trade depends on more than joint
consent. It also depends on having a solid common infrastructure, which
allows for transactions of goods and services supplied by specialized
actors.
It follows, of course, that there is an enormous amount of harm that
one can do by way of blockade. The initial position in virtually all of
these cases is that long and skinny things are open to all. Well, what do
we mean by "all" in the original situation? Remember the term "ius
naturale," which means that all political societies must accept these basic
norms to flourish.6 In ancient times, this was not easy to do. In that
setting, the options to create property rights tend to be sharply limited,
chiefly to rules that either give absolute priority, as with the acquisition
of land chattels, or complete parity, as with water and air.' So open to
6. For a modem discussion that goes back to Roman roots, see Samuel Gregg, Natural
Law and the Law of Nations, NAT. L., NAT. RTS., & AM. CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011),
http://www.nlnrac.org/carlymodern/law-of-nations.
7. For a development of this theme, see Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How
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"all" under these circumstances means anybody in the entire world. What
happened early on was, with densities being relatively low, people would
go back and forth, up and down a river, one way or another. As
mentioned earlier, there was very little organization of the commons, for
as a general rule there is no need to organize the commons when its
intensity of use is low. So, nobody really tried to figure out how to
manage the commons under these early systems because the issue never
came up. With private property, on the other hand, you develop, divide,
and trade it, and so forth. The early legal rules on private property talk
about exclusive use and the ability to develop, sell and mortgage, and the
like.
Now these are first approximations; later comes the question of
making changes. And certainly with respect to rivers, everybody wanted
change because there was a sense that if one could simply use the waters
for transportation, but could not drink from them, and could not fish and
so forth, then in effect the inability to make these constructive, separate,
consumptive uses of a common asset would sharply reduce its aggregate
social value.
People developed very intuitive systems, beginning with the
riparian systems. The first question is how much water can be taken out
of a river without destroying its essential nature.8 Then you prorate those
particular uses among the riparians by way of a customary law, because
when you have large numbers of people along a river, it is simply
impossible for them to agree contractually on a particular form of
allocation. Historically what develops is a focal-point equilibrium, in
which proration turns out to be the dominant theme. But that task is
always challenging because rivers flow in one direction, such that serious
asymmetries separate people at the top from those at the bottom. There is
the possibility that the riparians at the top can remove all the water, if left
unhindered. But just as that solution is undesirable, so too is any solution
that lets the people on the bottom insist that it all come to them
unimpeded. How best then to maintain proration in the face of this
asymmetry? Although the general rules of "open access" with their stress
on fair participation do not answer the question decisively, they at least
alert everyone to the basic trade-offs that have to be made.9
With respect to land, it turns out there are also approximations. At
Regulated? The Evolution ofProperty Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341 (2015).
8. For a longer discussion, see Epstein, supra note 2, at 399-404.
9. Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 423 (1874) ("It is a fair participation and a
reasonable use by each that the law seeks to protect." The asymmetries create difficulties for
imposing, noting sharp limitations on any use by the upper riparian "would give to the lower
proprietor superior advantages over the upper, and in many cases give him in effect a
monopoly of the stream.").
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the borderline, many times we have reciprocal obligations of support so
that I can build on my land and you can build on yours, but we cannot
excavate our land in such a way that our neighbor's land falls in.' 0 So,
again, what we do is start with the isolated boundary line, and then we
soften it." The theory is that each and every one of these alterations that
we create-largely by customary law as if in a state of nature-leaves
both parties better off than they would have been in the land case, and
leaves everybody using the river better off than they would have been if
blockades and complete diversions were permitted.12
It is often said that the origins of the public trust doctrine lie in
Roman law. The applicable passage, contained in Institutes: Book Two,
Section 1 ("The Classification of Things") reads:
The things which are naturally everybody's are: air, flowing water,
the sea, and the sea-shore. So nobody can be stopped from going on
to the sea-shore. But he must keep away from houses, monuments,
and buildings. Unlike the sea, right to those things are not determined
by the law of all peoples.13
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,14 the
court quotes the first of these two sentences, but not the other two: "From
this origin in Roman law, the English common law evolved the concept
of the public trust, under which the sovereign owns all of its navigable
waterways and the lands lying beneath them as trustee of a public trust
for the benefit of the people."1 5 It is important to note that the evolution
in question requires a major transformation from the earlier law. In the
Latin passage, the initial words "things which are naturally everybody's"
(naturali iure communia sunt omnium haec) show the gulf between the
original notion of open access that puts certain elements into the public
domain and a public trust document that requires a sovereign with
exclusive powers (of which there is none in the state of nature) to
manage and maintain those assets for its trust beneficiary-the public at
large. The first point to note here is that in the full original passage some
assets are kept consciously out of the commons. Why? Because houses,
10. For these rules, see, e.g., Birmingham v. Allen, L.R. 6 Ch.D. 284 (1877).
11. For a more detailed discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE
SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 186-213, (1998)
(pages 186-87 are particularly relevant).
12. For a more extended discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
13. JUSTINIAN 1, supra note 3, at 55.
14. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en
banc).
15. Id. at 718 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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monuments, and buildings gain their value precisely because they
increase in value when in the hands of a single owner. All of the
elements that are put into the common domain-the air, running water,
the sea, and consequentially the shores of the sea-are in general more
valuable as conduits for connection among people. Of these the beach is
instructive because, in general, it affords an easy means to go from one
place to another. But here the intersection with private uses remains. It is
said that under the law of nations "[a]nyone is free to put up a hut there
to shelter himself. He can dry his nets, or beach his boat."1 6 The use of
the word "hut" (casam) indicates some short-term shelter that is never
allowed to block free movement across the beach. In effect, this simple
passage illustrates the point. Private uses of the beach are tolerated
because they do not interfere with movement along the beach. But the
creation of any permanent structure is not tolerated because it would
interfere with free movement, which is why it is said, "ownership of
these shores is vested in no one at all."'7 The system will not work if
unilateral privatization of the commons is allowed.
The Roman rules on open access therefore illustrate the limits that
operate on its edges. But what remains to be explained is the critical
conversion from that open access regime in the state of nature to the
public trust doctrine, which necessarily requires a sovereign to run the
operation. So why put any sovereign in charge, and what is that
sovereign supposed to do? The explanation turns out to be roughly as
follows.
When you start with a river in a state of nature, two key points are
established. First, everyone can use it, and no one can divert the entire
corpus for his or her private use. Second, by implication no one can treat
the river as a dumping ground for private waste-a point which is not
clear from the earliest texts but becomes clear when private suits for
nuisances are allowed for discharges into rivers, but only by lower
riparians in defense of their property rights.'8 Stated otherwise, the rule
of ownership through initial occupancy, which is the rule for res nullius
that is explicitly rejected for res communis, means that no unilateral acts
by an individual are allowed to divert or drain the river for private
advantage. These two rules go a long way toward maximizing the social
value of the resource at hand. But by the same token, there is a powerful
upper bound as to what these two general prescriptions can do. For
example, in a state of nature, no one is under an obligation to maintain
the resource. And it follows that intense use creates the risk of collision,
16. JUSTINIAN 1, supra note 3, at 55.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 58 N.E. 142 (N.Y. App. 1900).
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congestion, confusion, or worse. 19 So eventually somebody says, and
everyone recognizes, the need to control the commons-not to exclude
people, but to organize their activities so as to maximize the value of
their combined use.
Yet who can discharge that duty? A quick review of a list of private
parties shows that none of them is ideally suited for managing the river
in its entirety. Any river will have a large number of riparian claimants,
none of which has control over more than a small fraction of the total
20
river resource. With no clear answer to which one should take over and
why, the default position is to turn to the sovereign that the political
system has already endowed with monopoly force within the jurisdiction.
Ideally, the actions of that sovereign are subject to some powerful
limitations, so that it cannot behave as though it owns the entire world,
and all its people. The use of the term "public trust" hearkens back to the
standard law of fiduciary duties, which means that the person in power
has to look after and protect the interests of his beneficiaries.21 As this
stylized history suggests, here is one occasion in which it pays to be
literal in thinking about how these trust operations work. That notion of
a trust is key in the private law, where it connotes a situation where the
trustees (often plural) are required to manage trust assets for the benefit
of others. The trust relationship is used in partnership and corporate
arrangements, and of course in private trust arrangements. Trillions of
dollars of assets in all forms are managed through the trust, so the
standard terms and incidents associated with its operation have been well
specified in these areas.2 2 These relationships in turn serve as the
template by which to lay out the fiduciary duties incumbent on the
sovereign as the public trustee. In private law, the trustee is entitled to
receive a fee for service. But it is important that the accounts be kept
separate so that the fee constitutes the sole payment, without additional
undisclosed benefits. The trustee is not entitled to help himself to the
fruits of the trust property. Although public trustees are entitled to
payment at market rates for services rendered, the king (originally), or
19. Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property
Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 533, 534-35 (2007).
20. Epstein, supra note 2, at 401.
21. The leading statement of fiduciary duty is still Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (1928) ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday
world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary tics. A trustee
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.").
22. The precision in the field is well captured by the standard glossaries of key terms. See
Glossary ofEstate Planning Terms, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/real
property_trust estate/resources/estatc_planning/glossary.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
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the state (more recently), is not entitled to treat those public trust assets
as though they were private property.2 3
The phrase "public trust" is therefore well chosen to handle the new
set of practices. The trust suggests the nature of the fiduciary operations
and the word "public" makes it clear that there is a large and shifting
population of beneficiaries, which includes everyone in the public. But
who is everyone? At this point- there is yet another complication. In the
state of nature, the want of a state implies that there are no subjects or
citizens of either a monarchy or a democracy. When something is open
to the public, therefore, it is open to everyone in the world, without
regard to who they are or where they live. The notion of nationality plays
no role at all in the original state-of-nature analysis. But once there is a
sovereign, there is necessarily a territory that the sovereign controls, and
that territory necessarily has its subjects or citizens, so the question that
then arises asks the extent to which the state can, in its control of public
resources, give preferences to its own citizens.
The attitude on this question is sharply divided. In principle, the
subjects and citizens have a leg up. In practice, if the only question is
access, then anyone, whether citizen or alien, who is lawfully in the
territory has access. But the legal rules have often taken a different turn,
giving citizens preferences that could not exist in the law of nature. Thus,
in McCready v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the state could
24prohibit outsiders from planting oysters in Virginia tidewaters. That
decision followed in a sense from the earlier decision in Corfield v.
Coryell, in which Justice Washington, while riding circuit, held that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV did not include the right
to plant oysters in the common waters of the state as a privilege or
immunity that was open on equal terms to outsiders. 25 The positive law
thus places a powerful constraint on the natural law. In general, it is not
likely to bind with respect to recreational uses. But it is likely to bite in
cases like the oysters, where the question is who gets to collect the fish
and other animal life in public trust lands and waters. In my view, the
correct position is that when the stakes get high, these property rights-
including rights to collect fish and oysters-should be sold off at auction
to maximize the value of the take for the state, which requires that the
outsiders normally be allowed to bid, even if they do not share in the
gains from sale. The point here is that no one would be happy if a sale of
corporate assets were restricted to bids from existing shareholders, as
23. For an explanation of the origins of the Public Trust Doctrine and criticism of its
modem development, see Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic
Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239 (1992).
24. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 395 (1876).
25. Corfield v. Corycll, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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opposed to everyone else. The price of the asset should increase as the
range of bidders increases, which could work to the advantage of all
citizens who divide the proceeds from the sale or lease. Once again, the
parallels to private trusts illuminate the public trust doctrine.
In dealing with more complex systems, the analysis is still harder,
because the articulation of the public trust doctrine is supposed to give
new possibilities to everyone who uses the common resources. But it also
requires the collection of revenues, whether raised by taxes or user fees,
to maintain those collective activities. In principle, the ideal
transformation from an open access regime to a public trust regime
should take the form of a Pareto improvement, which means that
everyone who had access to the initial common resource in the state of
nature is left at least as well off after the change to a public trust regime
is accomplished.2 6 That result in turn requires that the improvements of
overall operations, less the fractional share of the collective expenses,
leave everyone better off than before.
To step back a moment, this tradeoff is similar to that made more
generally under social contract theory in moving from a state of nature
into a civilized nation: the gains from political society exceed their costs
for each person, and thus necessarily for the whole. Indeed, ideally, it is
preferable that the gains in question be proportionate for all persons, so
as to avoid the jockeying that comes from giving some individuals a
larger fraction of a larger pie than others.2 7 It is no little exaggeration to
say that the execution of the public trust raises major problems on all
fronts. Who pays the taxes or fees? How are they to be spent? And who
gets access to what part of the system? If it turns out that the balance is
altered in some substantial way, then, as the night follows the day, the
question will arise whether a specific government action, pursuant to its
public trust powers, constitutes a taking of the private rights that ordinary
people enjoyed previously in the state of nature. It is at this point that
there is an instructive lesson from the intersection between American
common and constitutional law, to which I now turn, in dealing with the
creation of the public trust and its relationship to the navigation
servitude.
The most important case dealing with the public trust doctrine under
26. A Parcto improvement is defined in neoclassical economics as "an action done in an
economy that harms no one and helps at least one person. The theory suggests that Pareto
improvements will keep adding to the economy until it achieves a Pareto equilibrium, where
no more Pareto improvements can be made." Pareto Improvement, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/paretoimprovement.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
27. For a long exposition of this point in connection with the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993).
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American law is Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,2 8 the complex
history of which has been chronicled with great insight by Joseph
Kearney and Thomas Merrill.29 They explain in detail the institutional
complications and political challenges that gave rise to this controversial
deal, which in 1869 deeded large portions of the waterfront on Lake
Michigan, south of the entry point of the Chicago River into the lake.
The best way to understand what has gone wrong with the American
version is to note two features. The first is the extent to which the public
trust doctrine follows the private law, and the second is where it deviates
from it.
One of the first management duties associated with a trust is to
protect trust assets against looting and theft by others, and the same rule
applies to water cases. In dealing with water, the ultimate wrong is
diverting or damming up a river or lake so that all downstream parties
are shut out. One of the functions of the public trustee is to prevent just
those dissipations. The point is well illustrated in National Audubon,
where the challenge that faced California was keeping up the water
levels in Mono Lake in the face of diversions of large amounts of water
to serve the various metropolitan areas from a saltwater lake that
supported substantial populations of brine shrimp, which are in turn the
30food for the large number of migratory birds that flew over the area.
The protection of those birds in turn required the maintenance of islands,
which could not be reached by coyotes, their natural predators."1 When
the water levels started to fall, the entire cycle started to implode, so the
public trust doctrine was properly invoked,.even if its transformation
from Roman law was not fully understood.3 2
The question is how best to deal with these diversions. One Roman
maxim of immense importance is aqua currit et debet currere ut currere
solebat ("water runs and ought to run as it is accustomed to run"). In
effect, that maxim bridges the gap between "is" and "ought" by using the
natural baseline against which to measure diversions. One clear
advantage of this system is that it reduces the stress on the legal system
to find, or manufacture, some independent baseline, which is both costly
to define in the best of circumstances and in practice is subject to
political intrigue. A second is that the historical baseline is not likely to
28. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
29. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins ofthe American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004).
30. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 713-18 (Cal. 1983).
3 1. Id.
32. Id. at 732.
33. For its use in modem American law, see Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 532-33 (Cal.
1966).
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be arbitrary relative to its environment, because the flora and fauna have
long adapted to it, so that there is good reason to think it is a good first
approximation to a sensible long-term equilibrium, which it is with
Mono Lake.
When the stakes are low it usually pays to just follow this maxim,
without any effort to further fine-tune. But that need not be the case with
high-stakes ventures like Mono Lake, and the ultimate settlement
reached in that case reflected the basic need to tolerate incremental
adjustments.3 4 At this point, it was too costly to get immediately back to
the pre-diversion levels, so the parties devised a schedule by which the
water levels were allowed to rise until they reached a point where the
diversions could then be allowed to increase. There was no cash
compensation in this situation, doubtless because of the clouded nature
of the doctrinal experiment. But in principle, some compensation for the
diverted water seems appropriate under the standard public choice
argument. The easiest way to achieve that result is to put the water up to
bid, so there is both compensation to the system for its losses and an
effort to direct the water to its highest-value uses, which need not take
place under the existing settlement.
The duties of the standard trustee go beyond the protection of trust
assets from expropriation, for they also cover the sound management of
the assets subject to the trust, which usually includes the power to buy,
sell, and trade trust assets. The argument against any such exchanges is
that the trustee could abuse the power and leave the trust beneficiaries
worse off than before. But that capacity to mismanage assets is every bit
as great with the management and preservation of existing assets as it is
with their sale or exchange. After all, in any version, the trustee has to be
allowed to grant licenses for various individuals and groups to enter, to
set the fees that are charged, and, where appropriate, to create leases of
various bits of trust property so as to allow for fishing, sailing, boating,
and the like. At this point, the costs of forcing a trustee to keep an
unbalanced or under-diversified portfolio of assets are very high. Private
trusts, of course, have different assets. Some only contain financial
assets, while others contain operating assets that can include everything
from factories, mines, hotels, apartments, and much more. With both
management and operations, there is ample room for gains from trade,
just as there is with assets that people own outright in their own name.
What is striking about the position in Illinois Central is that it takes
34. As reported in ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN
WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 333-
375 (2013). For detailed information, see Today at Mono Lake, MONO LAKE COMMITTEE,
http://www.monolake.org/today/water (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
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the view that it is illegal for the state to sell any public trust asset to
private parties. In the context of that case, this conclusion, according to
Justice Field, allowed the state to revoke the grant to the Illinois Railroad
years after it was made, notwithstanding any changes in position that the
Railroad took in reliance on the deal. The Field position received a huge
boost of support from the late Joseph Sax, who looked with great
suspicion on any transaction entered into by government and private
parties.36 This presumption should, however, never be made absolute, for
it turns out to create dangerously restrictive rules for government actors.
Sometimes, keeping assets under public management is more efficient
than placing them in private hands, and what you need to do is to have
the same tests for fair value that are used in corporate transactions where
there is any hint of self-dealing. This is a rule that says "nor shall public
property be transferred to private use without just compensation."37
The theory behind this rule is that it is unwise to let the state just
give away natural resources. Nonetheless, if in fact the balance, when all
things are looked at, leaves the public better off making the transfer than
without it, with or without compensation, then the deal should go
forward because it creates a general Pareto improvement. To be sure,
even the dangers of self-dealing do not justify the total prohibition on
alienation, any more than in corporate contexts. The correct rule is the
"fair value" rule, whereby an independent assessment is made to ensure
that the state gets an equivalent for the goods that it swaps out to the
private party. If so, then the mutual-gain condition for exchange is
satisfied, and again it makes sense for the deal to go forward.
I have no doubt that it is often more difficult to apply these tests to
public assets than to private ones. But those differences are at best
matters of degree. The serious fear here is that the very rigid governance
structure for public trust assets leaves too much on the table. One recent
illustration of the problem is Lake Michigan Federation v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers, where the question was whether it was
permissible for the Army Corps to allow the development of an 18.5-acre
tract of land by a lakefront property holder, Loyola University of
Chicago.3 8 Allowing the development would have vastly improved the
35. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S 387, 453 (1892) ("The trust devolving upon the
State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of
property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the
property. The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to
such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of
without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.").
36. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
37. Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 417 (1987).
38. Lake Mich. Fed'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 442 (N.D. Ill.
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operations of the University, itself a charitable institution, and would
have created over two acres of public improvements along a stone
revetment with a walking and bike path. Anything that passes muster
with the Corps is likely to have a huge positive gain. Under current
administrative law, the usual decisions are evaluated under an "arbitrary
and capricious" standard, which in this case tracks the business judgment
rule, which is applicable in a corporate case where there is no trace of
self-dealing.39
Regrettably, the issue never got that far, as Judge Aspen held that
the per se prohibition of the public trust doctrine stopped the deal in its
tracks.40 But one can scour the entire decision without ever asking
whether this deal made sense. In this instance, the Lake Michigan
Federation was allowed to play the spoiler. It was as if a single
beneficiary under a private trust could stop a deal with an expected
positive sum. Judge Aspen claimed that the overall transaction had some
public benefit, but that it was prohibited because it was entered into
largely for a private interest, namely Loyola.4 1 But that conclusion
reflects near-sighted accounting. Private benefits count as part of the
overall social gain and loss, and that is especially true for charitable
organizations that themselves have fiduciary duties. It seems quite clear
that today's governance structure for the public trust is in this regard
sadly deficient.
A second problem with the public trust doctrine is that in some
instances it allows the public to trample ordinary private interests.
Historically the most vivid illustration of this problem lies with the
expansion of the navigation servitude under federal law, for which there
is a state law analogue of navigability that operates along the same
42
principles. One of the great achievements in the historical evolution of
land law was the separation of the notion of ownership from that of
sovereignty. The two had been fused together at the time of William the
Conqueror in 1066, and that merger only came to its end with the
1990).
39. Cornell Univ. Law Sch., Business Judgment Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edulwex/businessjudgment rule (last visited Apr. 26, 2016) ("In
suits alleging a corporation's director violated his duty of care to the company, courts will
evaluate the case based on the business judgment rule. Under this standard, a court will not
second guess the decisions of a director as long as they are made (1) in good faith, (2) with the
care that a reasonably prudent person would use, and (3) with the reasonable belief that they
are acting in the best interests of the corporation."); see also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (discussing the inappropriateness of applying the business judgment rule
where there is evident self-dealing).
40. Lake Mich. Fed'n, 742 F. Supp. at 449.
41. Id. at 445.
42. For example, see State v. Mcilroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980), which notes the
parallel federal use of the term.
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Tenures Abolition Act of 1660.43 Unfortunately, the rise of the
navigation servitude in federal constitutional law shows how the public
trust doctrine can be both used and abused. As to the former, it is clearly
within the province of the government to make sure that private parties,
whether riparians or others, do not damage the common waters of the
United States. It was for that reason that the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, still on the books, requires a permit for
dumping and dredging in public waters.4 4 It is the kind of management
that one can respect. Indeed, there are many cases from the nineteenth
century that ask the question of whether riparians are permitted to protest
against changes that take place within the river, where the rough answer
is that so long as the river remains within its banks, all is well, but if it
starts to flood uplands then the action can be enjoined, unless
compensation is provided.4 5 The basic test to determine the abuse of the
public trust doctrine in all these cases is this: Does the action of the
government amount to conduct that, if done by a private party, would
amount to a compensable wrong? If so, then it should be enjoined unless
the state is prepared to pay just compensation for its loss. If not, then the
private party may suffer economic dislocation but from no cognizable
harm, as per the distinction introduced at the beginning of this paper.
The modern cases on the navigation servitude pay scant attention to
this distinction. The basic approach is that the federal government has
43. Tenures Abolition Act 1660 12 Car. 2 c. 24 (Eng.). It should be noted that the statute
was passed in the twelfth year of the reign of Charles II, shortly after his restoration to the
Throne. The reckoning was from the execution of Charles 1. It was as if the Commonwealth
under Oliver Cromwell had never existed.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012).
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall
not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, picr, dolphin, boom,
weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the United States, outside established
harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or
modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater,
or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has
been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army prior to beginning the same.
Id.
45. See, e.g., Canal Appraisers of N.Y. v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 17 Wend. 571 (N.Y.
1836) (raising water within natural banks, no taking of riparian rights, by a thirteen to eleven
vote, with Chancellor Kent writing the dissent); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166
(1871) (permanent flooding, a taking). I address some of these cases in Richard A. Epstein,
Rediscovering the Classical Liberal Constitution: A Reply to Professor Hovenkamp, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 55, 83-90 (2015).
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jurisdiction over navigation on interstate rivers under the Commerce
Clause, a proposition that was settled as early as 1824 in Gibbons v.
Ogden.46 But the jurisdiction to regulate is not the same thing as
ownership of all that is regulated. The proper arrangement, which was
notably urged by Justice Mahlon Pitney, one of the true stalwarts of
limited government on the Supreme Court, was that the action could go
forward only if compensation was paid.47 But the forces of the
Progressive Era took the opposite position, so that once the government
decided it wanted to control the operations on the river, it could do so
without regard to the private losses that it created, all of which were
treated as non-cognizable. 48 The net effect is that the entire system of
correlative rights that dominated water law was displaced by an
absolutist navigation easement that ignored all the relevant trade-offs. It
is as though a system of limited and divided governance was replaced by
an autocratic monarch, based on the fundamental confusion between
federal power, which gives the government the right to make the laws,
and outright confiscation, which allows them to do so in disregard of
private rights.
The second problem asks just what property is subject to the public
trust doctrine. A classic illustration of how not to understand it is in
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association of New Jersey.49 The
court started by noting that in New Jersey, the public trust doctrine
extends not only to the channel, but up to the "dry sand beach
immediately landward of the high water mark,"50 which is perhaps more
than is necessary to allow access up and down the beach. Nonetheless, in
Matthews the court extended the scope of the public trust one step further
by applying it to seven extensions of streets perpendicular to the beach. It
seems clear that if access can be denied to the beach, much of the benefit
of free movement along the beach is necessarily lost, so there is good
reason to allow for the creation of passageways of this sort.
Now, what is the difference, and why is that decision wrong?
Keeping the river open essentially is a situation where you are trying to
overcome the serial blockade by adjacent landowners, for the same
46. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I (1824).
47. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
48. For key cases, see Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United States v. Willow River Power
Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United
States v. R. B. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967). For a more exhaustive treatment of these issues,
see Richard A. Epstein, Playing by Different Rules? Property Rights in Land and Water, in
PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 317 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds.,
2012).
49. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
50. Id. at 358.
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reason that the water is kept in the commons in the original position. But
there is no parallel blockade risk with respect to perpendicular access,
which could take place at a large number of locations. At this point, the
real question you have to ask is this: How many access points to a
seashore do you really need? If the state can claim them all at zero price,
it will claim every last one of them. But there is a way to ration its
activities, which is to require it to condemn or purchase, and compensate
for, the access rights to the beach, without declaring it public trust
property by a judicial ipse dixit. The imposition of the compensation thus
puts pressure on the state to reduce the number of access points to the
efficient level, so it will no longer engage in excessive condemnation.
There is also, given the takings power in this setting, no real holdout
issue. Since we do not know in fact which of these adjunct places is the
one that belongs to the river and which one does not, we cannot invoke
the public trust doctrine, even though it is perfectly sensible for keeping
the flow of rivers and lakes open. At that point the only question left is
whether the township can charge outsiders for access more than they
charge the insiders, who have of course funded the condemnation with
their tax dollars.
B. Conversions ofLegal Regimes
I have said enough to explain how complicated it is to set out a set
of correlative rights and duties in waters. But the issue becomes even
more vexing when the initial set of rights created leads to inferior social
results. Owing to the many interests involved, it is not possible to
envision voluntary transactions that will solve this basic problem. The
need for government coercion is evident, and the question is how it
should be exercised. That issue came to a head in Colorado, where the
riparian system, which favors in-stream uses over consumptive uses,
basically speaking, is a loser. The explanation that I like to give for that
mismatch is: "Oh, riparian landowner, bring your cows to the edge of the
Grand Canyon to drink the river's water." It is not going to work.
The issue arose in vivid form in the famous 1882 case of Coffin v.
Left Hand Ditch Co.,"' in which the Supreme Court of Colorado
shattered the old riparian system in order to legitimate the prior
appropriation system.52 Its move is tricky because both federal and state
constitutions protect private property, which surely means that these
rights cannot be wiped out with the stroke of a pen. But not if, as the
Court claimed in Coffin, there was an "imperative necessity" to switch
51. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). See also Epstein, supra note 2, at
403.
52. Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447.
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from one system to another, and to do so without the payment of just
compensation.5 3 The reason for the imperative necessity was that the
original common-law riparian system prevented water from being
diverted to land that was not adjacent to the river, where it would be used
far more productively. 54 Freezing the riparian system into place would
only have guaranteed the massive waste of water, and thus it had to be
replaced. The reason for denying just compensation was that there were
too many moving parts to allow anyone at a reasonable cost to determine
how much compensation should go to thousands of individuals. Given
these formidable difficulties, the court made the decision to obtain the
allocative gains without worrying about the distributional consequences,
trusting in part that the losers under the system would get at least some
compensation from the overall increases in productivity. Coffin was
handed down at a time when the consumptive uses dominated the prior
appropriation system, as it did for a long time.55 Today, there is much
pressure to move to a system that recognizes and protects in-stream uses
even in a prior appropriation state.56 That switch may well lead to a
modification of the prior appropriation doctrine, but it could never justify
a return to English riparianism, so ill-suited for Colorado rivers.
Indeed, there are vast difficulties with the appropriation system as it
is now configured, so much remains to be done. To put the point in a
somewhat different way, the only point that Coffin established was that
the prior appropriation system was superior to the riparian system that it
replaced along the Colorado River. What the case did not establish was
that the prior appropriation system then devised was the best of all
possible systems that could be created. The question is what
improvements can be made from the new baseline that Coffin
established. To see why there is ample room for growth, assume that an
ideal system of water allocation rates at 100. The shift from riparianism
to prior appropriation may move the needle from 5 to 20, which is a four-
fold improvement, but one which leaves a large amount of room for
further improvement.
In general, the important paths will be two: improved measurement
techniques and a response to changed technologies. With regard to the
first, it should be clear that a system that determines entitlements solely
based on the amount of water drawn out at a particular point from the
river must of necessity pay little or no attention to the way in which that
53. Id. at 446, 449.
54. Id. at 447.
55. For that defense, see Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of
Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638 (1957).




water is used once it is removed. At this point wastage within ditches for
example does not register as a social loss. By the same token, any effort
on the part of a particular rights holder to fix the ditch could have
uncertain external consequences. The improved technology could in
some cases increase the levels of return flow, but the prior appropriator
has insufficient incentives to make the change, given that some fraction
of the benefit will be obtained by others.
In a similar fashion, the switch from furrow to drip irrigation
increases the rate of absorption and reduces the return flow, which
prejudices downstream users. Yet by the same token, the appropriators
are reluctant to lower the amounts taken out, lest they be forfeited back
to the system. 7 On balance, it seems that the high levels of cultivation of
existing areas will have smaller yields than allowing the water to move to
areas that are less intensely cultivated, but there is no way in which this
transfer can be made within the current system of rights. What makes
these changes so difficult to deal with is that current measurement
techniques make it difficult to determine whether these changes (which
can never be a Pareto improvement) count as a Kaldor-Hicks
improvement. Finding ways to measure the entitlement by net
consumption at a given point might go a long way to ease some of these
questions.
As is often the case with water law, the principles that apply to
disputes between individuals often apply to those between sovereigns:
After all, the movement of water over long distances will necessarily
give rise to disputes between two sovereigns, whether one works under
the riparian or prior appropriation system. Thus in Nebraska v. Iowa,59
the Supreme Court invoked the standard Roman law principles of
alluvion and avulsion to determine the boundary between Iowa and
Nebraska: the small shifts along the muddy Missouri after both states
joined the union were part of the ebb and flow, but the single avulsion
along the river did not change the overall boundary.
The same issues arise within a prior appropriation system. One
recent illustration of the problem is the long-going lawsuit Montana v.
57. Vanessa Casado Pdrcz, Crying Over Spilled Water: Rethinking Prior Appropriation
Rights and the Meaning of Agricultural Efficiency 22 (Oct. 12, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2633146.
58. Pareto Improvements and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Criterion, RECKON LLP,
http://www.reckon.co.uk/open/Parcto-improvementsandKaldor-Hicksefficiencycriterion
(last updated Dec. 14, 2010) ("[A] Kaldor-Hicks improvement is defined as a change that is
either a Pareto improvement or such that: the 'winners' from the change would be able to
compensate the 'losers' and still be better off (Kaldor criterion); and the 'losers' could not
afford to bribe the 'winners' to prevent the change (Hicks criterion).").
59. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359(1892).
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Wyoming,o which presents the issue in stark form. As is often the case,
Wyoming and Montana entered into a treaty which allocated the amount
of water to be used by the two states by the laws of prior appropriation.6 '
The dispute arose when Wyoming landowners adopted a more efficient
system of irrigation on the same lands as before, which reduced the
amount of the return flow to Montana. The Supreme Court held that so
long as the water was used on the same acreage specified in the original
treaty, Montana could not complain that the amount of water that it had
received had been reduced. 62
The opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas followed the model of
prior appropriation law to a T, which is a source of systematic
uneasiness. The danger here is that unilateral technical changes by one
party that work for its own benefit cannot be prevented by the other side,
which is rendered worse off. Where these changes are small, they are
probably not worth worrying about, but once they become larger, it is
questionable whether larger changes should be met with the same level
of indifference. It is of course possible to renegotiate any treaty, but the
obstacles to that task are indeed formidable, especially since any
renegotiation requires that the individual rights holders in each state be
brought into the process. There is a further question of whether
something like a federal eminent domain procedure can be put into place,
but here again, figuring out which rights holders receive which levels of
compensation is no easy task. At this point, it could be asked whether the
judicial boldness of Coffin could be brought to bear, for which I think
that the answer is a decided no. The overall gains to the system from
shifting rights is unclear, and the size of the individual losses is really
high, unlike any uncertain riparian rights along Colorado rivers. The
strength of the Coffin decision lies in the fact that we know that the
aggregate gains are huge and the private losses are negligible. 63 Clearly
much remains to be done in this area.
It does not follow, however, that there are no reforms that can be
made without tackling the matter of vested rights. One possible
modification of the system is to relax the view that all appropriation
60. Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368 (2011).
61. The key provision of the Yellowstone River Compact is Article V(A), which
provides: "Appropriative rights to the beneficial uses of the water of the Yellowstone River
System existing in each signatory State as of January 1, 1950, shall continue to be enjoyed in
accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the doctrine of
appropriation." Yellowstone River Compact Act of October 30, 1951, Ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663
(1951), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/STATUTE-65/STATUTE-65-Pg663/content-
detail.html.
62. Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. at 379-82.
63. For further discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to Social Welfare:
Theoretical Principles and Practical Applications, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1743, 1767-72 (2015).
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rights must be consumptive. It should be perfectly possible for people to
purchase rights to water that they then for various ecological or
environmental reasons leave inside the river in order to support various
aquatic forms of life or recreational activity.64 If anything, leaving some
water in the river will have the effect of promoting the consumption
rights of some persons downstream from the decision to leave water in
the river. Once that approach is taken, people like Craig Mackey65 can
work their agenda to maintain the Colorado River's volume without
having to secure major legal reforms in the prior appropriation system.
The approach here is exactly what nature conservancies do when they
acquire land, and there is no reason why that same strategy cannot be
adopted with respect to water. Nor is this an enterprise that only private
parties can undertake, although it is one that they should engage in. The
state can also make budget commitments to water rights acquisition, with
the idea of buying, preferably in the voluntary market, water rights that
are worth more to the state than they are to the seller.
The key advantage of this program is that it avoids the destructive
public choice dynamic in which the only way one side wins is for the
other side to lose. Those conflict games benefit no one in the long run,
which is one reason why just compensation should be usually required
when property rights of value are taken. It takes the sting out of the
resistance. If you throw in the correct level of compensation for the
rights bearer, resistance should melt away because now you increase the
possibility of achieving a Pareto improvement where both sides are left
better off than they were before. So it is absolutely critical in these
particular cases to think about the definition of a property right not only
in terms of the historical origins, but in ways that start to facilitate
exchanges.
One last cautionary point here is that coerced exchanges are not the
only source of risk. Subsidies for various groups are always risky, even
for small players. Water law should not fall prey to the infant industry
fallacy whereby marginal firms are given an extra lease on life, one
which can go on for far too long. There is in this regard nothing special
about water rights. The purchases that are allowed for farmers in Central
California Valley are no better than the special subsidies that are given to
ethanol or wind or solar energy. All subsidies distort in the short run, and
for the most part those losses are only compounded in the long run. The
argument here is just another application of the fundamental rule of the
public trust doctrine: The state does as much harm when it gives away
64. See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2008).
65. Craig Mackey was a panelist at this conference, supra note 1, and is Co-Director of
Protect the Flows, a coalition of businesses that protect and support the Colorado River.
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resources for below market value as it does when it takes them for below
market value. Sales are fine, but only with just compensation.66 And once
that full price is demanded, we will see the same behavior in water
markets as everywhere else. People will economize so that the demand
for scarce resources declines, which is the socially desirable result.
II. THE COMMONS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
It is quite clear that the lion's share of this paper has been devoted
to the operation of the water system, where the interaction between
private rights and the commons gives rise to many complexities. But of
course the intellectual commons is also a central part of any system of
intellectual property. The creation of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and
trade secrets differs in many particulars, but all of them start with the
assumption that there is a core set of notions that lie outside any and all
systems of private intellectual property rights. These core elements are
ones that all individuals are entitled by right to use as much as they want.
The use of the English language is, of course, part of the general
commons, even if certain trade names are not. The "Monopoly" trade
name does not block economists from talking about monopoly power.
Let me therefore begin with a story from thirty years ago that helped
me to understand the power of the intellectual commons. The incident
was an exchange with my daughter, then aged five. We were riding home
from the University of Chicago Laboratory School, and we started to
spell names. As we crossed 55th Street, my wife and I came to my
daughter's name: Melissa. We said "M-E," and when the "E" came out,
Melissa burst into tears. We said, "Melissa, why are you so upset about
the E?" She looked through the tears and cried out, "I need to save the E
to spell Rachel's name!" Rachel was at that time her best friend. Now
what was my daughter thinking? This is actually a very serious point.
She had these magnetic letters, which you put on the refrigerator. Those
letters, it turns out, are a scarce quantity. If you take the "E" and you put
it in "Melissa," it is no longer available to put in Rachel's name. That
single E can be used only once. So armed with this powerful visual
image, Melissa was fully justified to protest that the "E" was now being
allocated to the wrong person. But what is nice about language, as I tried
to explain to her, was this: "My dear daughter, you know that when it
comes to ordinary language, letters are platonic forms of which you have
an infinite supply at zero price. There is no scarcity constraint operative
in this domain." And she looked at me, somewhat puzzled. The tears did




not stop. But the insight still stands. Scarcity is not a universal constraint.
For some forms of intellectual property there is indeed an inexhaustible
supply, necessarily at a zero price. Unless we criminalize the use of the
letter E, there is now a powerful verbal commons that no one creates and
from which everyone benefits.
From this one example, it follows that this commons has to be
protected against encroachment by private ownership. And it is easy to
see why what holds with letters also holds with numbers, and what holds
with English sentences holds for mathematical sentences, so that no one
could ever gain a right to exclude others from the use of the formula that
the area of a rectangle is length times width. It is instructive, too, that no
one has ever tried to extend intellectual property to ordinary language
and basic mathematics. It takes little imagination that no one should get a
patent on the method of spelling Melissa with an "E" or Newton's laws
of motion. The arguments about the intellectual commons track that for
watercourses. The blockade costs are very high, but the privatization will
do little to promote discovery in this area. If you want to encourage proof
of Fermat's last theorem, by all means let some private party award a
prize for the proof, which of course could never be achieved if everyone
had to pay a royalty for applying the Pythagorean Theorem.
The question then arises: What falls into this intellectual property
commons? The customary answer is: scientific laws, mathematical
theorems, and natural compounds of elements. You cannot patent
polonium, gold, or silver. They are out there in some natural form and
you have not added the inventive step. 6 7 So the great challenge in this
particular system is how to build the private system of property rights
that works with natural elements. One form of property rights that was
not mentioned at all in the Silicon Flatirons conference was trade secrets.
The question is: Why not? Well, let us suppose that there is something
that is already held in common and you decide to treat it as a trade secret.
Since everybody knows it anyhow before you do it, your supposed trade
secret has zero value. So trade secrets essentially develop a kind of
natural rhythm of their own. The only information that can be subjected
to a trade secret is information whose value to you depends in part on
67. European Patent Convention art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 1.L.M. 286 (stating the U.S.
equivalent of nonobvious: "An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if,
having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art.").
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
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keeping it secret from others. So the law develops fairly comprehensive
definitions of trade secrets,6 8 and it then allows these things to be traded
under promises of confidentiality, understanding always that if
somebody else develops that same trade secret independently, no one can
stop that person from using it. Indeed, in many cases more than one
person has the same trade secret, perhaps unbeknownst to others, and all
are entitled to keep them that way.
In dealing with trade secrets, the law allows first privatization and
then free entry. It turns out the full operation of the system can become
quite complicated because somebody who steals a trade secret, or obtains
it by inadvertence, will typically not disclose the trade secret to the
public. After all, that disclosure creates a public good of what would
otherwise be a duopoly. Since many trade secrets cover industrial
processes, parallel invention works quite well, as notions of theft can be
carried over into this area. To be sure, there are major difficulties in
connection with whether to allow the reverse engineering of trade
secrets. The complications that arose eventually led to the adoption of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.69
My view is: That is a hard question. I am not here to talk about hard
questions. I am here to talk about easy questions. Now why do I want to
talk about easy questions? Because, if these questions receive the wrong
answer, it is fatal. On the other hand, if there are close, difficult questions
that are not answered quite right, the difference between the first and
second best alternatives is likely to be far smaller, so that the overall
system can survive those mistakes. So here are some very general
comments about the different forms of intellectual property that surround
70the basic commons.
The first area is the trademark. The first salient point is that a
68. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1985), which covers:
[l]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to or readily ascertainable through
appropriate means by other persons who might obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
The earlier common law definition is found in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM.
LAW INST. 1939). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been enacted by forty states and the
District of Columbia.
69. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 960 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (guarding against reverse engineering
to unlock copyrighted works).
70. See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76
IND. L.J. 803 (2001) (expounding these issues).
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trademark always has an infinite duration.71 The basic point here is that if
you put a trademark into the commons against the will of its owner, it
becomes worthless because the trademark is designed to offer an implicit
warranty of the quality of the goods produced under the brand, which is
self-executing in the sense that no one need sue to inflict sanctions on a
firm whose branded product turns out to be dangerous or ineffective. The
reputational loss attributable to widespread customer defection is
magnified by the brand. Yet if any seller can use anyone else's brand, the
bonding device breaks down, for it does not make sense for customers to
abandon a reputable firm for the derelictions of another that has used the
same brand. So the major question about the trademark is whether or not
its "secondary" meaning has become part of the English language so that
words like "Xerox" are always running the risk of falling into the public
domain, until the generic term "copier" makes it easier to protect the
mark. It also turns out that "Cola" goes into the public domain but
"Coca-" does not. So you get "Coca-Cola" and "Pepsi-Cola," but you do
not get "Coca-Cola 2."
The question is: Do we eventually cover the world too much with
privatization? My answer is: I am less pessimistic than some people here
because I think language is always generating new terminology. If you
look at the Internet age and so forth, we have a whole set of terms that I
never quite understand in dealing with social media, so that the language
is in general refreshed by new terms just as old terms go out of style.
Copyright, of course, presents problems of its own. There is no way
that one can copyright terms in ordinary use in the English language, and
in general, the originality requirement is one effort to mark off the
private from the public space. That requirement does enormous good in
many cases, but it turns out not to work so well with databases. Thus the
important Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.72 holds that there is nothing original in the
"selection, coordination, and arrangements" of the white pages that Feist
copied from Rural, and hence denies it copyright protection. 73 The
decision is right in its result but wrong in its argumentation. There are
two problems here that require some notice. The first is that Feist did not
have to compensate Rural for the great deal of labor it took to put
together the data set. Second, Feist's appropriation will thus unravel all
the other licenses that other compilers had arranged with Rural, given
that Rural got that information because it was the sole provider of
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058-1059 (2012); see also Trademark FAQs, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Aug. 5, 2014, 9:17 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/lcaming-and-
resources/trademark-faqs.
72. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Scrv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
73. Id. at 359.
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telephone service within the region.
The combination of these two facts is suggestive of the proper
solution. The first point is that it is always dangerous to allow one person
to profit off the labor of another, and the second point is that the
monopoly position that Rural had with respect to its information requires
some institutional response against supracompetitive profits. Regarding
the first, the most suggestive precedent is International News Service v.
Associated Press,74 which Justice O'Connor cites in Feist for the
proposition that copyright protection under the 1909 Act only attaches to
original works. Otherwise, Justice O'Connor thought that the earlier
decision was irrelevant, but in fact its logic dictates the opposite
conclusion from that she reached in Feist. At issue in INS was whether
the INS reporters who copied information off the bulletin boards that its
competitor AP had prepared exclusively for its own members' use had
committed a tort when they reworked that material (so that it did not
involve copying the original bulletin verbatim) and which they then sent
by telegraph to the West Coast for use by INS members. In dealing with
this case, the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis each noted that
the best that AP could hope for was some notification to the effect that
the information in question had been collected from the AP boards so
that all persons would know who the source was.7 This argument
followed the standard libertarian premise that the limit of protection
between traders involves the use of force and fraud.
It is quickly apparent that the disclosure remedy is of no help to AP.
The subscribers of INS may well be even more willing to use that
information for their stories knowing that it comes from AP and not
some fly-by-night source. Justice Pitney (himself a master of equity)
understood that point and invented as a common law matter a tort of
misappropriation that allowed AP to enjoin the use of that information by
its direct competitor, INS, for the period of a single news cycle-here,
one day.7 7 But that formulation meant first that the information contained
in the bulletins could be used immediately by anyone who read it from
their papers. It also meant that anyone else, AP included, was free to use
information about the underlying events that they collected themselves.
The point here was to prevent the theft of labor without creating an
undue monopoly power.
Justice O'Connor explicitly stated that INS had no application to
74. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press (INS v. AP), 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
75. Feist, 499 U.S. at 354.
76. INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 246-48.
77. Id. at 232 (stating the actual injunction prevented copying "until its commercial value
as news had passed away," which in practice is one day).
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Feist.7 8 But that was a mistake. The correct response was to recognize
that the misappropriation of labor was as much an issue in Feist as it was
in INS, so that it was pointless to wait for regulations to introduce
protection into this area. At this point, the want of originality only means
that the protection will not be found under the Copyright Act, but under
the common law. But the entire picture also requires that some weight be
given to the monopoly position of Rural. The simplest way to do that is
to note that, as a monopolist, it is under the general duty to issue licenses
to this material to all comers at a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
rate.7 9 At this point, the combination of two related areas of law create a
coherent approach. But once Feist became law, lower courts were forced
into the pointless exercise of asking whether sufficient originality
inhered in various data sets met the Feist test.80 If not, then they could
use it for free.
Within the domain of copyright, there are of course exceptions of
which the most notable is for fair use,8 ' which has no patent parallel.
There is a very good reason for that. The first point is that under the
copyright law, fair criticism is always protected by fair use. One could
not criticize a doctrine, or an article, or a literary work without quoting
short passages from it. So if the publication is not an effort to scoop the
original publication, as The Nation did when it published large portions
78. Feist, 499 U.S. at 353-354.
79. See, e.g., Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (discussing rates);
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10741 (2012) (non-discriminatory) and § 10701 (2012)
(reasonable).
80. See, e.g., BellSouth Advert. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, 999 F.2d 1436
(11th Cir. 1993) (holding yellow pages unprotectable); Key Publ'ns v. Chinatown Today
Publ'g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding the database is of interest to
Chinese-Americans).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id.
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of Gerald Ford's autobiography,82 it is fine to quote some passages of
deathless prose to show how good or bad the author is. The work is fair
game even if the author cannot thereby be subject to gratuitous abuse.83
There is a good reason why in the core cases of review the critic
should never seek out the person whose work he wants to review, be it
author or chef. The risk here is that the only critics who will gain access
to the protected work are those who expressly or impliedly promise to
shade their account in favor of their subject. That result will degrade the
information generally, creating a real public loss. And it will also make it
difficult for excellent authors or chefs to credibly obtain the strong
reviews that they deserve. Bypassing contractual arrangements thus
improves the collection and transmission of information for all
concerned.
There is yet another reason to favor fair use in a number of contexts.
It is a way to overcome blockades by individual copyright holders. Thus
a simple picture may contain a Coke can in the background. Does Coke
have to give consent for the picture to be woven into a documentary? My
own view is clearly not. I think that the best analogy to this case comes
from the law of privacy, where it is widely understood that individuals
who appear in news pictures at public events have no claim for invasion
of privacy.84 The point could prove important. Thus suppose that
someone would like to make a documentary which shows the history of
the telephone, which could only be done by using short clips from a
multitude of films, each of which contains multiple copyright materials.
The sums in question are small, but the number of consents needed is
large, so that it is on balance better to displace the requirement of consent
with a "live-and-let-live rule" similar to that which is used for low-level,
reciprocal nuisances.85 The level of reciprocity is far from perfect, but the
overall gains are large. Unlike the situation in INS, it is perfectly clear
that this class of uses is not competitive with any use of the copyrighted
material that could be made by its owner. And, generally speaking, if
somebody mentions your work in a documentary, by-and-large it is
going to be favorable, so you receive some just compensation in
exchange anyhow.
So the best solution is essentially a series of bright-line rules, which
places a clear limit on the amount of time for any given exposure.
Normally, time is scarce, so that it is unlikely that documentary
filmmakers will want to dwell unduly on some given image. There are of
82. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
83. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n, 71 N.E. 739 (N.Y. 1904).
84. See, e.g., Tropeano v. Atl. Monthly Co., 400 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1980) (stating the
inclusion of a picture in a story is not appropriation for advertising purposes).
85. See Bamford v. Turnley, [1860] 122 Eng. Rep. 25, 32-33.
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course exceptions to every rule, of which the most conspicuous is found
in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,86 where someone
recorded, for only fifteen seconds, a performer jumping out of a
cannon.87 If the performance is shown once, its value in commerce is
gone, which is a far cry from the usual clip that serves as a teaser for the
entire picture. The general case, rather than the exceptional case like
Zacchini, should dominate the rule. Therefore, short-term permission is
needed to overcome potentially serious holdout problems. This also
avoids the impossible task of organizing a compensation system in which
the amount needed to run the transfers could exceed the amount
transferred, especially since there is no obvious uniform market value for
all the relevant clips and excerpts in question. The aggregate gains justify
in this instance any deviation from ideal measurement, especially since
the rule does not target selectively any particular copyrighted work. The
case here is a far cry from the ASCAP/BMI situation where entire songs
are played multiple times.8 8 In that setting, getting the compensation
right through some centralized agency that can monitor performances in
various venues is now warranted, as the cost of its administration is a
relatively small fraction of the total payments that must be made. Yet in
these instances, finding the correct compensation levels is critical for the
long-term stability of the arrangement.
At this point, I turn quickly to patents, where the question of what
belongs in the common pool has long been a subject of contention. One
of the worst cases in this area is Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co.,89 decided in 1948, written by Justice William 0. Douglas,
who was strongly anti-patent. There, a scientist named Bond found a way
to place certain root-nodule bacteria in a single inoculant that could be
used to work on several different kinds of bacteria simultaneously. Prior
to his discovery, a separate inoculant had to be prepared for the dealing
with the separate bacteria in clover, alfalfa and soy beans, which was a
long and laborious process. Justice Douglas held that this advance was
not subject to patent protection at all because it only involved the
assembly of natural products and thus should be treated as a non-
patentable law of nature. 90 Why this ad hoc information should rise to the
dignity of a "law of nature," when it bears no resemblance to Newton's
law of universal gravitation, is left unexplained. The solution that Bond
hit upon could not be logically deduced. It could only be verified by
86. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
87. Id. at 563.
88. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1 (1979) (noting the
antitrust issues, which in this instance are mitigated by the strong opt-out positions).
89. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
90. Id. at 130-32.
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extensive trial and error work, for which patent protection is fully
warranted. The creation of patent protection should not be limited to
matters of inspiration. Those of perspiration apply as well, whether your
name is Bond or Edison.
The decision in Funk Brothers helped spur the adoption of the 1952
Patent Act,9 ' the remarkable document by Pasquale Joseph Federico and
Giles Rich that contained a broader definition of patent eligible works.
They hit on the basic structure by taking broad classes of patentable
subject matter, subject to an individualized test, which asked whether or
not the advance in question would have been evident to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. One of the real fruits of this decision was the
expansion in patent eligibility in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,9 2 which made
genetically engineered microorganisms patent eligible, leading to the
DNA revolution, or at least the protection of the processes and products.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has tended to take a narrower
view of patent coverage, which rehabilitates cases like Funk Brothers. In
general, I think it is a mistake to deny protection anytime it costs an
inventor a small fortune to put some new project together, when it costs
someone else virtually nothing to imitate it. Unfortunately, the recent
decision Alice v. CLS Bank held that the detailed specifications for how a
program interacted with machinery was patent ineligible, which leads to
the question of whether any such instructional software device can ever
fall within a patent eligible class.93 So long as the program and
equipment inputs real data and chums out some instruction, it looks as
though the device should be patent eligible, even if it must then survive a
non-obviousness test, which was the position of Giles Rich in his
decision in re Alappat.94 Typically, these patents do not act as blockades,
given the success of standards organizations in coordinating separate
patents into workable portfolios, both for use by their members and
others.95 Indeed, there is a serious danger that inventions that are left in
91. Patent Act, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390
(2012)).
92. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303-04 (1980).
93. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014).
94. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (upholding an oscilloscope patent,
noting: "Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements recited in claim 15
represent circuitry elements that perform mathematical calculations, which is essentially true
of all digital electrical circuits, the claimed invention as a whole is directed to a combination of
interrelated elements which combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform data
samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means.
This is not a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized as an 'abstract
idea,' but rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result."
(footnotes omitted)), abrogated by in re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (2008).
95. Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff & Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC, IP and SSOS:
Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 17-
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the public domain will be commercialized by no one, which is why the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 encouraged first universities and then individual
inventors to patent inventions developed with the support of federal
funds, lest they languish unused in the public domain. 9 6 The judgment
behind Bayh-Dole has to be that the greater security of knowing that
some device is patent protected can result in more development than for
a device that anyone else could in secret work to commercialize. The
public domain has an important role to play in patents. But it hardly
follows that its relentless expansion is required for overall social
innovation. It is dangerous to be dogmatic about its primacy.
III. THE SPECTRUM WITHOUT A COMMONS
The spectrum presents an interesting historical challenge because
the resource cannot exist until the technology is created. 97 In dealing with
the allocation of spectrum, the first question is whether it ought in some
sense to be in a commons. But in this instance, the value of the spectrum
depends largely on its use as a mode of communication. The key
requirement is to make sure that all the usable spectrum is allocated in
such a way that all persons who desire access can obtain it. That is best
achieved in two ways. First, with broadcast, the problem takes care of
itself, given that the publication of the information is open to all who
have a receiver. Second, with respect to telecommunications between
discrete persons, the correct response is to regulate those in charge of
transmission as common carriers to assure that all have access, at least in
those cases where there is a single provider. Once these two measures are
taken, it is doubtful that there is a need for any commons, subject
perhaps to the common exception for low frequency, short-distance
operations like TV remotes, garage openers, and wireless car keys which
can operate side-by-side with more powerful signals with broader range.
In principle this simple pattern should be easy to obtain, but
historically that did not prove to be the case. The original allocation of
the spectrum in the United States took place shortly after the Titanic sunk
in April 1912. The Communications Act of August 191298 contained a
general licensing scheme that allocated huge chunks of the spectrum to
the most insistent short-term user,99 the United States Navy, for ship-to-
18(2012).
96. Bayh-Dolc Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2012)).
97. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 1.L. &
ECON. 1 (1959); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 135 (1990).
98. Communications Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, 37 Stat. 302 (1912) (repealed 1927).
99. Id. §§ 1-3.
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shore technology.10 0 One of the unfortunate decisions of the 1912 Act is
that it not only designated exclusive rights, but also that it designated the
purposes for which those particular rights should be used. That system
was more comprehensively developed under the Radio Act of 1927.101 It
is as though the government created a system of land titles that had the
effect of dividing up New York City, where the government allowed
someone to own a plot of land on 5th Avenue and 42nd Street, subject to
the constraint that he could only use it for a single family home, unless
some zoning board approved some particular change. Indeed, this
comparison is more apt than might appear at first blush. Herbert Hoover
as Secretary of Commerce was most active in securing the passage of the
1927 Act. The year before, he convened a well-known meeting of state
authorities from which emerged A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
("SZEA"),1 02 which set the template for state zoning laws. That same
year the Supreme Court gave zoning its constitutional blessing in Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co. o3 By 1930, the SZEA had served as the template
for thirty-five state zoning statutes. 104
The effort to create different zones of spectrum turned out to create
dangerous rigidities that have lasted until this very day. In 2005, Thomas
Hazlett offered a simple graph that showed huge variations in the
intensity of use of different portions of the spectrum, depending upon the
uses to which they were assigned.' 0 5 Looking at the spectrum reserved
for public uses, the intensity of use is low. Looking at the spectrum that
is used by cell phone companies, the intensity of use goes through the
roof. Yet there is no set of private transactions that can correct this initial
regulatory imbalance, because the spectrum uses are locked in by Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") allocation rules that are in
practice virtually impossible to change, except through contested
political action. 106 The greatest single obstacle to technical innovation
remains the licensing system of the FCC. With regard to common
carriers, the old system remained in place until 1982, when it was undone
100. See Coase, supra note 97, at 1-4.
101. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (amended 1934).
102. DEPT. OF COMMERCE., ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
ENABLING ACT: UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926),
https://planning-org-uploaded-media.s3.amazonaws.com/legacyresources/growingsmart/pdf/
SZEnablingActl 926.pdf.
103. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
104. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 75-76 (3d ed. 2005).
105. Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. REG. 242, 248 (2005).
106. Robert C. Barber & Michael P. Goggin, Spectrum Policy and Its Impact on the
Nation's Broadband Future, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2012, at 11, 12-14.
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judicially by Judge Harold Greene in United States v. A T& T,10 7 which is
only the first in a complex set of regulatory maneuvers that lasted for
over a generation.' 0 8
A parallel development took place on the broadcast side of the
industry, where government regulation blocked the emergence of a
"bottom up" system, under which the owner of the frequency, so long as
it does not create interference to other users, may shift its uses without
first obtaining government approval. One prototype of this system
existed in nascent form between 1920 and 1926. Indeed the famous
decision in Chicago Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station,
Inc.109 sought to adapt the rules of initial occupation applicable to land
and chattels to the spectrum. But that initial effort was overwhelmed by
two other judicial decisions. First, in 1923, one district court restricted
the ability of Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce to withhold
licenses from potential new entrants. 0 Thereafter, in 1926, a second
district court held that the United States lacked the power to impose use
restrictions on the individual licensees."' These interferences from
multiple frequencies created "chaos" in the broadcast industry that led to
the passage of the Radio Act, which was extended seven years later by
the 1934 Communications Act,'l2 where the name change foreshadowed
the technology for television. This legislation did, of course, far more
than sort out boundary disputes between neighboring licenses. It also
established the standard by which these licenses should be granted,
renewed, or revoked, which stressed the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity."ll 3 That standard was duly upheld against constitutional
challenge by Justice Felix Frankfurter in National Broadcasting Co., Inc.
v. United States"14 based on his confident judgment that the FCC, like
other modem agencies, should not be charged just with setting the rules
of the road for the spectrum but also should be put in charge of
determining the "composition of that traffic."" 5 Frankfurter pointed to
107. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
108. For my extended commentary on the case, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST
CONSENT DECREES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE 54-73 (AEI 2007).
109. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, Inc. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 1926)
(reprinted in 68 Cong. Rec. 215, 215-219, 69th Cong (2d Sess. 1926)).
110. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Corp., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. 1923).
I11. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
112. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-622 (2012)).
113. 47 U.S.C. § 307 ("The Commission, if public convenience, interest or necessity will
be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefor, a
station license provided for by this Act.").
114. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943).
115. Id.
The Act itself establishes that the Commission's powers are not limited to the
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the inevitable scarcity of spectrum, which necessarily could not be left
open to all. But scarcity is endemic to all resources, and hardly requires
that government licenses determine who has what use of a particular
resource. Unfortunately, the very idea of putting the spectrum up to bid
formed no part of Frankfurter's progressive world view. Seventy years
later, no one on the bench, in the agencies, or in the universities has been
able to come up with a consistent account of how these frequencies
should be allocated."1 6 The result is major technical rigidity and
institutional uncertainty in the property rights regime from which no one
benefits in the long run.
There was an alternative path, which was to proceed cautiously by
way of analogy to other forms of trespass, making those adjustments
necessary to define the permissible levels of interference across
frequencies under some version of live-and-let-live, without giving the
government power to revoke licenses at will. The correct approach
would have been to sell off different portions of the spectrum, subject to
these boundary conditions. That proposal was made most notably by
Ronald H. Coase in his 1959 article on the Federal Communications
Commission." 7 But even then, Coase did not think of endowing the
spectrum with a full set of property rights that could be sold, leased and
mortgaged to one and all. Instead, he conceived of the system as one in
which "if there were a market, what would be sold, is the right to use a
piece of equipment to transmit signals in a- particular way. Once the
question is looked at in this way, it is unnecessary to think in terms of
ownership of frequencies or the ether."" 8 But in fact the more radical
approach of frequency allocation offers the more accurate solution to the
underlying problem. Equipment becomes obsolete. There is no reason to
tie the use of any given frequency to any given technology. When new
equipment allows for better or different uses, just allow those transitions
to be made without government intervention. If it turns out that better
equipment allows for more content to be transferred over the same band,
engineering and technical aspects of regulation of radio communication. Yet we are
asked to regard the Commission as a kind of traffic officer, policing the wave lengths
to prevent stations from interfering with each other. But the Act does not restrict the
Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the
burden of determining the composition of that traffic. The facilities of radio are not
large enough to accommodate all who wish to use them. Methods must be devised for
choosing from among the many who apply. And since Congress itself could not do
this, it committed the task to the Commission.
Id.
116. See Coase, supra note 97, at 13; see also Hazlett, supra note 97 (for the most
trenchant criticisms).
117. See generally Coase, supra note 97.
118. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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it is appropriate to allow the owner of the frequency to subdivide it,
taking care to establish parameters to govern potential interference
between different users. If it turns out that it makes sense to lease some
bits of the spectrum to someone else, it is appropriate that the lease sets
both the broadcast content and the choice of equipment. There is, in
effect, no reason whatsoever why any government agency should
overlook these issues so long as the owner (i.e., no longer a licensee)
stays within the appropriate interference levels.
The folly of the opposite position is revealed by Cosmopolitan
Broadcast Corporation v. FCC.11 9 The Cosmopolitan Broadcast
Corporation designed its program to meet a very important need: to get
minority voices on the radio when the major broadcasters like ABC,
CBS, and NBC all catered to the median viewer. To achieve that end, the
company leased its spectrum to various users for limited periods of time,
with heavy concentrations in Spanish- and Italian-speaking users. All in
all, broadcasts were made in eighteen different languages at their
appointed times, each of which got them an audience to which they could
tailor advertising. Apart from regulation, the system is perfectly viable.
The contracting device allows for specialized agents to take advantage of
their knowledge, generating gains from trade shared across the board.
So what does the FCC think about this innovation? Not much,
which is why they shut it down. Why? Because they said it is the duty of
a broadcaster to determine content, and you cannot delegate that duty to
a set of time brokers who in turn lease it to a set of end users. The
position in question runs afoul of basic FCC policy under which
"licensees have an affirmative, non-delegable duty to choose
independently all programming for broadcast, in light of the tastes and
ascertained needs and problems of the community."l20 The decision is
quite remarkable because it somehow suggests that the delegation by a
licensee leads to a deterioration in quality when in fact the opposite is
true. But there is no analysis of the soundness of the FCC policy. There
is only a rote application of that rule to the particular case.
This instability is not confined to licenses on the broadcast side. It
also carries over to the common carrier side, where the fragility of
licenses allows for cancellation by the government without, it appears,
serious financial repercussions. One illustration of the problem is the on-
going litigation saga over the FCC's decision to revoke the LightSquared
119. Cosmopolitan Broad. Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 581 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir.
1978). 1 have commented at length on this decision in Richard A. Epstein, What Broadcast
Licenses Tell Us About Net Neutrality: Cosmopolitan Broadcast Co. v FCC, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 86 (R. May ed., 2009).
120. Cosmopolitan, 581 F.2d at 921.
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license to build out a third telecommunications network.121 It has
provoked just the form of social dislocation, political maneuvering, and
senseless litigation that a secure system of property rights would
avoid. 12 2 This would not have happened if LightSquared had been
allowed to purchase the spectrum band from previous owners, at which
point the government could have taken it only by paying just
compensation for the band. That requirement in turn would have forced it
to make a candid and accurate estimate of whether its proposed new use
was worth the cost that it takes to put it in play. That bedrock principle of
takings law applies as much in the context of spectrum as it does
everywhere else, which is why the principles of property law have
greater tenacity and wider application than is commonly accepted. In this
instance, the claim was made by the firms in the GPS industry that they
needed to "listen in" on the LightSquared band in order to do their own
work. That willingness to make that claim depends on the ability to
acquire it for zero price. Once it becomes clear that they have to pay for
what they take, their willingness to make technical innovations that
would reduce or eliminate those demands would vastly increase, which
makes it highly unlikely that the actual transfer of spectrum would have
taken place on the same terms. The social costs of the FCC decision are
not small, for they include $2 billion worth of front-end investments and
a business venture that could have transformed the industry, producing a
net profit of over $10 billion for LightSquared, with greater options for
its customer base.1 23
CONCLUSION
It is important to understand the enormous stakes that attach to the
proper selection of property rights for various types of resources. The
reason why the problem is so difficult is that it is not possible to state in a
priori terms what legal regime, either public or private, applies to any
given resource. And it is surely a great mistake to assume that in
equilibrium all property should be placed in private hands under a regime
that gives its owner exclusive rights to control the resource. That
121. See LightSquared Saga Shows Problems with U.S. Spectrum Policy: View,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 6, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-
02-07/lightsquared-saga-illuminates-problems-with-federal-spectrum-policy-view (reviewing
the background of the LightSquared and FCC issues).
122. For discussion, see Thomas W. Hazlett & Brent Skorup, Tragedy of the Regulatory
Commons: LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. I
(2014). See also Richard A. Epstein, Possession and Licenses: The FCC, Weak Spectrum
Rights and the LightSquared Debacle, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 237-265
(Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015).
123. For a brief discussion, see Epstein, supra note 2, at 409.
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assumption is a good first approximation with respect to land, chattels,
and animals, but it is always one that is subject to modification that deals
with the roadblocks that this system could otherwise produce. It is also
the case that with water, air, and beaches, some kind of a commons
solution appears to work, but once again it is subject to pressures that
push in the direction of limited privatization. It takes constant awareness
to make sure that the balance does not move too far in the one direction,
or too far in the other. Yet, the only way that the correct balance can be
maintained is to be aware that even in the natural law system, property
rights have both dynamic and stable features. It is the task of good
analysis and good decision-making to be aware of the twin dangers that
drive the system: the dangers of externalities on the one side and
holdouts on the other. That simple guide is not a solution to all problems.
But it does offer a convenient jumping off point for an analysis more
general than the one that can be offered here.
